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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1990, as University of Florida students prepared to start another academic year, the modest college town of Gainesville, Florida was rocked
by the discovery of the mutilated bodies of two co-eds.' As investigators

* This note received the Barbara W. Makar Award for the outstanding note in the Fall 1993 semester. A version of this note was presented to the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communications, Kansas City, Mo., Aug. 10-13, 1993. The author wishes to thank Dr.
Bill F. Chamberlin, Joseph L. Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication, University of Florida
College of Journalism and Communications, for reviewing drafts of this article. Dr. Chamberlin's expertise
in media law is exceeded only by his willingness to assist students in research projects.
1. From the discoveries of the first victims to Danny Rolling's 1994 guilty plea, media coverage of
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searched for the killer, three more bodies were discovered.' With no less
than the good name of Florida's flagship university on the line, the brunt of
the state's criminal investigative forces focused on Gainesville.
The scope of the investigation of the Gainesville student murders was
rivaled only by the amount of media attention the investigation received.
Although the investigation involved hundreds of law enforcement personnel
and produced an estimated 100,000 pages of investigative records,3 little
information was released to the hundreds of reporters residing temporarily in
Gainesville during the investigation. However, when police arrested Danny
Rolling, a thirty-eight-year old Louisiana drifter already serving multiple life
sentences for several unrelated charges and charged him with the murders,
the remarkable public access requirements of the Florida Public Records Law
transformed what already was a extraordinary case into a battle between the
right to know and the defendant's right to a fair trial.
More than two years later, on October 27, 1992, journalists lined up
early at the Alachua County Courthouse in Gainesville to await the release of
more than one hundred investigative files in the Gainesville student murder
case of State v. Danny Rolling.4 Using laptop computers to download hundreds of pages of law enforcement records, the reporters participated in the
first stage of what Assistant State Attorney Donald Royston described as
"probably the nation's first computerized dissemination of pretrial discovery
records in a criminal case."' The disclosure followed an unprecedented ruling by Florida Circuit Court Judge Stan Morris ordering the release of some
4330 police reports, physical evidence, and other information in the case
against Rolling.6
To ensure Rolling's right to a fair trial, the judge refused to release photographs of the victims, autopsy reports, reports containing statements made
by or attributed to Rolling, and ten reports from technical experts.7 All other
records were opened by the ruling, which stated that the public has a presumptive right of access to records produced in criminal discovery. Morris
later ordered the release of another 2800 records in the case already reviewed

the Gainesville student murders was national in scope. A brief sample of the coverage as the story unfolded includes: Fear Grips Florida College Town After 3 Slayings, CHI. TRiB., Aug. 28, 1990, at 5C; Mike
Reynolds, Five Young People Found Murdered at Florida University, REUTERS, Aug. 28, 1990; Killings
Terrorize Florida College Town, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1990, at Pl.
2. Rene Stutzman, Fourth, Fifth Bodies Found Near University, UPI, Aug. 28, 1990.
3. Mary Shedden, Many Files on Rolling Will Open, GANESVa.LE SUN, Oct. 23, 1992, at 5A.
4. Files on Rolling Come Out Today, GAINESVILLE SUN, Oct. 28, 1992, at 8A.
5. Interview with Donald Royston, Alachua County State Attorney's Office, in Gainesville, Fla.
(Nov. 16, 1992).
6. State v. Danny Harold Rolling, Order of Disclosure 6-14 (Fla. 8th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3832 CF A)
(order on disclosure of pretrial discovery materials).
7. Id. at 7-12.
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by Morris, the state attorney's office, and defense attorneys.' Despite the
judge's limitations on access, Rolling represents the most liberal application
of state public records law to criminal discovery in Florida and perhaps national history.
Yet Rolling presents but the most recent example of an oft-repeated legal
battle in Florida. Judicial records--civil and criminal-are among the best
sources for news stories. They provide a rare glimpse into the minds of prosecutors, investigators and suspects, and provide leads which often uncover
additional newsworthy information. Few judicial records are more valuable to
journalists than discovery records, which allow reporters to review each step
in the investigative process.
In an attempt to make the criminal trial "less a game of blindman's bluff
and more a fair contest," 9 the courts require both parties to provide to the
other side before trial the evidence that each intends to use at trial. During
discovery in criminal cases, the state must provide the defendant with the
names and addresses of all persons known to have information that may be
relevant to the pending action. 0 Consequently, criminal discovery proceedings are a rich source for news stories. Criminal discovery materials often
include all police and investigative reports of any kind prepared for or in
connection with the case." Aware of the news value of such information,
the news media frequently seek access to discovery records. Florida courts
have found at least two legal origins for the right of access to discovery
records: the Florida Public Records Law and the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The two provisions work in tandem to provide the public's statutory right of access to pretrial discovery materials.
The Florida Public Records Law specifically opens criminal discovery
records. 2 Because the Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate the release of
most investigative reports in connection with a pending criminal case, 3
much of the pretrial material generated in a criminal investigation attains the
status of public records through the discovery process.
This paper will discuss the development of the right of access to discovery records in Florida. Such an examination requires review of both the
Florida Public Records Act and the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provide a framework of the arguments for and against access to discovery records. The paper outlines the development of the right of access to
criminal discovery records, and illustrates its continued expansion despite

8. Mary Shedden, More Rolling Files Set to Be Opened, GANESVILLE SUN, Oct. 29, 1992, at lB.
9.

COURT
10.
11.
12.
13.

JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTrUTmON: LEADING SUPREME

CASES AND INTRODUCTORY TExT 520 (1992 ed.)
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A) (West 1993).
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B) (West 1993).
FLA. STAT. § 119.011(3)(c)5 (1993).
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B) (West 1993).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

(Vol. 6

federal precedent to the contrary in the area of civil discovery. Finally, the
paper will address the factors that the courts use to base their decisions on
access to discovery records.
II. THE LAW REGARDING ACCESS TO DISCOVERY RECORDS:
THE PUBLIC RECORDS LAW
For more than twenty-five years, Florida's government has earned recognition as being one of the states most proactive in opening its process to
public examination. The Florida Public Records Law states that all government records, with particular exemptions, shall be open for public inspection. 4 "Records" are defined broadly to include documents or other material, including photographs, tapes or even sound recordings made in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency." Public documents may be examined by any person desiring to do so at any reasonable
time. 6 The list of exemptions to disclosure begins by declaring that all records which are presently provided by law to be confidential or which are
prohibited from being inspected by the public are exempt from disclosure."'
Another subsection provides an exemption for criminal investigative information, which is defined as materials gathered for the prosecution of a criminal
defendant." Pursuant to the statute, however, such information becomes
accessible to the public when the information is given to the person arrested.
Another subsection states that the exemption for criminal investigative records shall not be construed to exempt records "made part of a court file and
not specifically closed by order of court. .".
."" Finally, another provision
states that the Public Records Act "is not intended to expand or limit the
provisions of Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, regarding the
right and extent of discovery by the state and a defendant in a criminal prosecution."' These sections combine to provide a general statutory right of
public access to records given to a criminal defendant, unless the records are
sealed by the trial court. An analysis of all fifty states' open records laws
finds no comparable statutory right of access to criminal discovery records.2
Florida's longstanding statutory right of access to government records

14. FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1993).
15. Id. § 119.011(1).
16. Id. § 119.07(1)(a).
17. Id. § 119.07(3)(a)-(k).
18. Id. § 119.07(3)(d).
19. Id. § 119.07(4).
20. Id. § 119.07(5).
21. I reviewed the open records laws of all 50 states using Lexis. As of November 1993, none contained a similar provision for discovery records. See also Judicial Records: A Guide to Access in State
and Federal Courts, Vol. 13, No. 2, NEws MEDIA & THE LAw IA (Summer 1990).
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and meetings recently became part of the state's constitution. In November
1992, Florida voters approved the creation of two sections of the state constitution, granting public access to records of the executive, judicial, and
legislative branches of state government.' Under the amendments, all three
branches of government will have to obtain exemptions by legislative action
that allows for public input and debate. New exemptions to the access
laws face increased scrutiny because the law requires consideration of all
exemptions in single-subject bills that must state the public necessity justifying the amendment.' The amendment essentially places the Florida access
statutes under the rubric of state constitutional law, fortifying the public's
right of access to records and meetings.
Ill. THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
JuDIcIAL PROCEDURE IN ACCESS CASES

The authority of the judicial branch to control the release of discovery
records in criminal trials is enumerated by the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure.2 The rules allow the judge to prohibit or partially restrict the
disclosure of information that may "seriously impair" the investigation, but
otherwise places no limits on public access to depositions or access to discovery records. A motion for a protective order is not always motivated
solely to prevent prejudicial publicity. In a criminal trial, depositions may be
used to impeach the testimony of witnesses or to introduce testimony when a
witness is unable to appear at trial. 6 Because discovery records are not automatically entered as evidence, they may contain information later declared
inadmissable by the court.
The Florida Supreme Court in 1992 clarified the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, a set of court rules designed to augment the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, by providing greater detail for the rules on public access
to the records of the judicial branch and its agencies."' While leaving the
majority of the rules regarding access to judicial records intact, the court's
decision is significant because it acknowledges, for the first time, that the
judiciary is subject to the same standards of openness that govern similar
records in other branches of government.' While the court exempted pre-

22. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24. For analysis of the constitutional amendment, see Kara M. Tollett, Review ofFlorida Legislation: Comment, The Sunshine Amendment of 1992: An Analysis of the Constitutional Guarantee ofAccess to Public Records, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 525 (1992).
23. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24.

24. Id
25.
26.
27.
cords,
28.

FLA. R. CRim. P. 3.220 (West 1993).
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(j)(6), 3.220(h)(1) (West 1993).
In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration-Public Access to Judicial Re608 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1992).
Memorandum from the Florida Society of Newspaper Editors and First Amendment Foundation to
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liminary drafts, notes, or other written materials prepared as part of a court's
judicial decision-making process, many other records formerly closed were
opened by the new rules.2 Finally, the court stated that the rules adopted by
the court are intended not to close any judicial records currently open, but to
open many judicial records formerly closed.' Thus, the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration provide
a strong presumption of public access to judicial records.
When conflicts arise between the judiciary and those seeking access to
discovery records, the trial court judge must incorporate the rules of discovery and the provisions of the Florida Public Records Law pertaining to discovery records. As stated earlier, the discovery rules require the state to
disclose to the defendant, upon request, any papers or objects which were
obtained during the investigation of the defendant. 3 The Florida Public Records Law states that once such information is given or required to be given
to the defendant, the discovery records are opened to public inspection.'
The conflict does not end at this point however, because under Florida discovery rules, any person is permitted to show cause for denial of disclosure. 3 The public's right of access to discovery materials must be balanced
against the defendant's constitutional rights of a fair trial and due processO
The broad right of access illustrated by the release of discovery materials in
the Rolling case is the product of the Florida courts' interpretation of the
open records law's unique statutory provision.
IV.

THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DISCOVERY

RECORDS IN FLORIDA
The statutory right of access to discovery records is but a more recent
pronouncement of an old idea: "the notion, deeply rooted in the common
law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' "" The common
law right of access in Florida has been reinforced largely by legislative enactments in the last quarter-century. Before 1967, however, Florida courts
used the general exemption to the Act, which states in pertinent part that "all
public records which presently are deemed by law to be confidential...
shall be exempt from the provisions of this section," to create public policy

the Membership of the Florida Society of Newspaper Editors, Public Access to Judicial Records and Florida Bar Records (Nov. 9, 1992) (on file with author).
29. 608 So. 2d at 472-73.
30. Id. at 473.
31. FLA. R. CRIm. P. 3.220 (b)(1)(F) (West 1993).
32. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(3)(c)(5) (1993).
33. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(m).
34. Florida Freedom Newspapers v. McCrary, 520 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla. 1985).
35. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14

(1954).
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exemptions for judicial records.36 Not until 1979, in Wait v. Florida Power
& Light Co., did the Supreme Court eliminate the judiciary's power to restrict access to discovery records by creating exemptions to the Public Records Law.3 7 The case arose out of litigation before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission between Florida Power and Light Company
(FP&L) and the City of New Smyrna Beach (New Smyrna). The case concerned the construction and maintenance of FP&L's nuclear power plants.
During pretrial discovery, FP&L sought to inspect records regarding the
planning and maintenance of New Smyrna's new electrical operations.38
New Smyrna denied the request, claiming that the records contained confidential material. FP&L filed suit in the circuit court seeking the documents.
The circuit court granted access to the documents; the First District Court of
Appeal affirmed.39 New Smyrna appealed to the Florida Supreme Court,
which held that FP&L had the right to inspect the documents. In affirming
the district court's findings, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the history
of the Public Records Act and its exemptions. The court noted that the Act
originally exempted records "deemed by law" to be confidential, allowing the
judiciary to create exemptions for discovery records. 4'
In 1975, however, the Florida legislature amended the statute to restrict
the exemptions to only those "provided by law."' Given the change in the
statute's wording, the court cited with approval a Fourth District opinion
concluding that "[i]t seems obvious .. . that the very purpose of the statutory
amendment was specifically to ...preclude judicially created exceptions to
' The court added
the Act in question."42
that it would not "equate the acquisition of public documents under the Public Records Law with the rights of
discovery afforded a litigant by judicially-created rules of procedure." '3
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court held that exemptions to the Public Records

36. FLA. STAT. ch. 67-125, § 7(2)(c), 1967 Fla. Laws 254, 256 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
119.07(3)(a) (1993)). In Wisher v. News-Press Pub. Co.. 310 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), the court of
appeal created an exemption for the personnel files of a Lee County employee. Initially, the court recognized that employee records were not exempted by any particular provision. Id The court interpreted the
Act as empowering the judicial branch to create exemptions when "deemed by law to be confidential." Id
After analyzing the potential harm in disclosing personnel files, the court concluded that it was in the
public interest to deny access to personnel files, thus creating a judicial exemption to the Florida Public
Records Act. Id. at 348. The Florida Supreme Court later quashed the Wisher decision, Press Pub. Co. v.
Wisher, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977), but did not restrict the judiciary's power to create exemptions until
Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979).
37. Wait, 372 So. 2d at 425.
38. Id. at 422.
39. Id. at 422-23.
40. Id. at 424.
41. Id.
42. Id.(citing State ex rel.
Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA
1977)).
43. Id. at 425.
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Act could only be made by statute. Judges could no longer create exemptions
through discovery rules.
The Florida Supreme Court first recognized this restriction in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh.' McIntosh arose from a pretrial "gag
order" on the press and all participants attending the securities fraud trial of
three brokers and their respective firms. At the request of the defendants, the
trial court judge entered an order prohibiting "any extrajudicial statement or
interview relating to the trial of this cause... ." Striking down the gag order, the Florida Supreme Court held that the public and the press have a
fundamental right of access to all judicial proceedings.' However, the Court
qualified this right by ruling that the right of access is not absolute:
Since no two criminal trials are exactly alike, each trial judge
must apply federal and state interpretations of the Bill of Rights
and balance the rights of free press and fair trial to assure that
justice and fairness prevail in each trial. To attain true justice the
written47 law must be seasoned with a proper amount of common
sense.

Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on its recipe for "common
sense," leaving the formulation of a balancing formula to the lower courts.
That standard developed through a series of district court decisions, including
News-Press Publishing Co. v. State" and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
State,49 that relied on McIntosh to conclude that trial courts may not summarily deny media access to discovery records. In News-Press, the Second
District Court of Appeal ruled that because depositions constitute a pretrial
judicial proceeding, the public must be granted access to transcripts unless
"compelling reasons" are shown. 0 News-Press arose from a court order
sealing depositions in a first-degree murder case. A newspaper filed suit after
the judge refused to lift the order even after the defendant pled guilty to a
lesser charge. In remanding the judge's order for reconsideration, the district
court outlined the compelling reasons that must be specifically set forth before judicial records may be sealed:
As applied to the instant case, a showing that the opening of
the depositions might endanger a person's life could well justify

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

340 So. 2d
Id. at 907.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 910.
345 So. 2d
363 So. 2d
345 So. 2d

904 (Fla. 1977).

865 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
at 867.
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the order entered below. On the other hand, an understandable
desire to protect the victim's family from exposure of the details
of what was apparently a heinous crime would not warrant an
order which would preclude public access to official court records
in the form of these depositions. The press must be counted on to
report such facts in a responsible manner."
In 1978, a balancing test for judicial closure orders was created in Miami
Herald, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a judicial
proceeding could be closed only if the party seeking closure could prove
that: (1) closure is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice, (2) less restrictive alternative measures are not
available, and (3) closure will in fact achieve the court's purpose.52
Florida district courts of appeal used the three-part test promulgated in
Miami Herald to open a wide variety of judicial proceedings and records.
The first mention of the test with regard to discovery proceedings appears in
Sentinel Star Co. v. Booth,53 in which the Second District Court of Appeals
remanded a closure order sealing all defense discovery depositions in a murder trial. In Booth, the trial court judge sealed the depositions after a brief
hearing with criminal counsel.' The reporters present at earlier hearings
asked the judge when he would hold a hearing on the motion to seal depositions, but no specific notice was given before the motions were heard. The
trial judge did not offer any member of the media an opportunity to be heard
prior to ruling on the motion.
In remanding the trial court's order for "a more thorough inquiry," the
court of appeals instructed the trial judge to apply the three-part test set forth
in Miami Herald.55 In addition, the court adopted the language of McIntosh,
further raising the standard for closure: "expression by the press must constitute 'an immediate, not merely likely, threat to the administration of justice.
The danger must not be remote, or even probable, it must immediately imperil.' "56 The court concluded that the trial court's brief inquiry did not
demonstrate such a compelling reason for closure.
In quashing a court order closing discovery records in a first-degree
murder trial in 1980, the Fifth District Court of Appeal not only adopted the
three-pronged test from Miami Herald but found little difference between the
chilling effect inherent in prior restraint and the chilling effect created by

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
363 So. 2d at 606.
372 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 102.
Id. (citing McIntosh, 340 So. 2d at 908).
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limitation to judicial records." In Ocala Star Banner v. Sturgis, the court
held that an order limiting public access to pretrial discovery proceedings and
records failed to meet the three-part test.58 The court stated that although
there may have been compelling reasons for sealing some of the records, the
trial court failed to specifically set forth the reasons for closure in the order.59 The court rejected the trial judge's argument that setting forth the reasons for closure would divulge the information in question, ruling that if
necessary, the judge can conduct an in-camera, or private, inspection to see if
the reasons given by the defendant are sufficient.
In 1979, the First District Court of Appeal in Tallahassee Democrat v.
Willis' established the filing of discovery records as the "trigger" for public
and press access. In ruling that a trial judge erred in issuing an administrative
order instructing court officers to seal depositions (statements given during
the discovery process), even after they are filed with the clerk of court, the
First District relied upon the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration.6 The
court of appeals held that under the Florida Rules, depositions and other
discovery records are open for inspection by the public and the press when
filed by the clerk of court.62 After reviewing the applicable discovery rules,
the court concluded that the protection of the defendant's right to a fair trial
could still be accomplished under the discovery rules. Records still could be
closed by order of the court, but on a case-by-case basis, rather than by
blanket administrative orders. Absent a protective order, however, discovery
records attain the status of being public once they are filed with the clerk of
court.63
In Willis, however, the court stopped short of opening the records in
question. Clearly troubled by the competing interests of access and the administration of justice, the court certified the matter to the Supreme Court of
Florida for review of the administrative order." In its dicta, the First Dis-

trict Court stated that its opinion addressed only the narrow issue of blanket
administrative orders, adding that the First Amendment does not entitle the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Ocala Star Banner Corp. v. Sturgis, 388 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
Id. at 1370-71.
Id. at 1371-72.
370 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
The court cited the Florida Rules of Court, 1979, Rule 1.310(f)(1), which provides as follows:
If transcribed, the officer shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly sworn by
him and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness. He shall
then securely seal the deposition in an envelope... and shall promptly file it with the
court in which the action is pending or send it by registered or certified mail to the clerk
for filing.

Willis,
62.
63.
64.

370 So. 2d at 868.
Id. at 870 (citing FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.280(c) (1979)).
Id.
Id. at 872.
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petitioners to court records that are properly sealed by the trial judge.' The
court said the appropriate forum for that issue would be the Florida Supreme
Court.,
Florida courts continued to adopt the three-part test from Miami Herald
to open a variety of discovery records. 7 Trial courts even opened records in
the widely publicized trial of mass murderer Theodore Bundy" and in the
trial of a Miami policeman resulting from the death of black motorcyclist
Arthur McDuffie-the subject of the infamous Homestead riots during the
1980 Super Bowl.' The lower courts uniformly applied the three-part test
in disputes over access to judicial records, but the Florida Supreme Court
had yet to render an opinion regarding the test's viability.
In its 1982 decision in Miami Herald v. Lewis,'0 the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed the common law presumption of public access to pretrial
suppression hearings. More importantly, the court held that the common-law
right of access to pretrial hearings and records in Florida extends beyond the
First Amendment parameters established by the United States Supreme
Court. By modifying the common-law test for judicial closures, the Florida
Supreme Court retained the broad right of access to judicial proceedings and
records, including discovery records. Lewis was typical of the cases troubling
the lower courts in the light of Miami Herald.Fourteen-year-old Brooks John
Bellay was the key suspect in the murder investigation of four-year-old Angel Halstead. Halstead, who had mysteriously disappeared, became the subject of extensive coverage by local news media. Bellay was interviewed and
quoted widely, partly because of his seemingly intimate knowledge of the
crime and the location of the body. Bellay later confessed to the police,
which the media promptly reported. As a result of this publicity, the court
noted that "the public had been made aware, by the news media, that Bellay
had confessed to the crime."7 Faced with an avalanche of publicity, the
trial court judge entered an order closing the suppression hearing regarding
Bellay's statements and furthered ordered that all records of the suppression
hearing be closed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the judge
properly closed the hearing, but concluded that the order closing the records
did not meet the three-part test. 2
The Florida Supreme Court opened its opinion by recognizing the three
65. Id. at 871.
66. Id.
67. See Palm Beach Newspapers v. Nourse, 413 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Satz v.
Blankenship, 407 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Sanchez, 7 Med. L. Rep. 2338 (Fla. 15th Cir.,
Palm Beach County (Nov. 17, 1981)) (Case No. 81-5354 CFA02).
68. Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1984).
69. State v. Diggs, 5 Med. L. Rep. 2596 (1980).
70. 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982).
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id.
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dimensions of the issue: the authority of the court, the rights of the defendant, and the rights of the public and press."' The court acknowledged that
each of the three interests enjoys independent powers and freedoms, but
concluded that all three collide where access to pretrial judicial proceedings
are concerned. The court next turned to the United States Supreme Court in
hopes that one of two recent decisions, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale4 or
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,75 would offer guidance. Richmond Newspapers was not analyzed because it concerned the closure of an entire trial. A
lengthy discussion of Gannett led the Florida Supreme Court to conclude that
the United States Supreme Court had yet to issue any definitive statement
regarding the application of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to pretrial
proceedings.76 Thus, the Florida court found that the United States Supreme
Court left "considerable leeway in determining how we will resolve this
problem in the state of Florida."' Finding that Gannett did not require
abandoning Miami Herald's three-part test, the court decided to modify the
common-law test to compensate for each of the three conflicting interests in
judicial access disputes. The modified rule stated that closure would be allowed where:
1. Closure is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice;
2. No alternatives are available, other than change of venue,
which would protect a defendant's right to a fair trial and;
3. Closure would be effective in protecting the rights of the
accused, without being broader than necessary to accomplish this
purpose.7 8
The Lewis test added two new wrinkles to the Miami Herald test. First,
the court eliminated change of venue as an alternative to closure in the second arm of the test. The court justified this change by ruling that because
there is no First Amendment right of access to pretrial hearings, the courts
should not subjugate the defendant's constitutional right to be tried in the
county where the crime was committed.' Second, the third arm of the test
was expanded to require courts to demonstrate that there is a substantial
probability that closure will be effective in protecting against the perceived
harm.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 3.
Id. (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)).
Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)).
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After outlining the modified test, the court then outlined the procedures
for determining courtroom closures. First, the court held that as agents for
the public on the issue of courtroom closure, the news media must be given
an opportunity to be heard on the question of closure prior to the court's
decision.' Those seeking closure should provide an adequate basis of fact
to support closure, including such factors as the extent of prior hostile publicity, the probability that the issues involved at the hearing will further aggravate the adverse publicity, and whether traditional alternatives (continuance, severance, change of venue, etc.) will solve the problem. Having discussed the administrative procedure for courtroom closure, the court then
required trial courts to begin with an assumption that a pretrial hearing be
conducted in open court "unless those seeking closure carry their burden to
demonstrate a strict and inescapable necessity for closure."8 Finally, the
court noted that the news media have no First Amendment right to attend the
pretrial hearing as long as the transcript is made available at some specified
future time. 2
With its decision in Lewis, the court accomplished far more than modifying the three-part test for courtroom closure. The court rejected the argument
that pretrial hearings and records should be closed because they often contain
unfounded allegations and evidence later found to be inadmissable at trial.
Instead, the court ruled that because the searches and interrogations that such
hearings evaluate do not take place in public, the hearings are of great public
importance. Indeed, the court based its support of public access on the argument that the pretrial hearing is often the public's only opportunity to learn
about police and prosecutorial conduct. By requiring that a transcript be
made available in the event of pretrial closure, the court added yet another
hurdle for parties seeking closure of discovery records. In sum, the court's
decision in Lewis validated the common law right of access to pretrial proceedings, and thus to discovery records, developed through lower court decisions.
V. SEATTLE TIMES V. RHINEHART. THE LIMrED EFFECT
OF FEDERAL PRECEDENT

In 1984, the United States Supreme Court held in Seattle Times v.
Rhinehartthat "pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial." '3 Although the decision pertained only to civil litigation and involved a narrow factual scenario, Florida courts have invoked its
holding in a number of cases limiting access to civil-and criminal--dis-
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covery records. Rhinehart is important to this discussion not for its holding,
but for the Court's analysis of a Washington state discovery rule similar to
the rules in Florida. The litigation in Rhinehart arose from discovery proceedings in a libel suit brought by the spiritual leader of the Aquarian Foundation against the Seattle Times. During discovery, the newspaper requested
lists of the foundation's donors and members.' Rhinehart refused, claiming
that disclosure would harm both the foundation and its membership and
asked the trial court for a. protective order sealing the names and donations.
Pursuant to state discovery rules modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court issued an order compelling respondents to identify all
donors who made contributions during the five years preceding the complaint, along with the amounts donated." Undaunted, Rhinehart filed a motion for reconsideration, renewing his request for closure and supplying affidavits claiming that release of the records would adversely affect foundation
income and subject its members to harassment and reprisals." Persuaded by
these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the discovery process that pertained to the names or financial affairs of the foundation. The trial judge based the order on Rule
26(c) of the Washington discovery rules, which states that upon good cause
shown, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a
party or person from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." ' The order prohibited the Seattle Times from using discovery information in any way except for trial preparation. The newspaper
appealed the protective order to the Supreme Court of Washington, which
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in issuing the protective
order. The United States Supreme Court ostensibly agreed, ruling that the
trial court judge must retain the power to oversee the discovery process.'
Instead of limiting access to all discovery records, the Supreme Court
fashioned a two-part test. First, the trial court judge must consider "whether
the practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression."8' 9 Also, the judge must
determine whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular government interest involved."' Applying the test to Rhinehart, the Court held
that since discovery historically was not a public event, it is not a component
of a public trial. Further, the Court distinguished the closure of discovery
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records from instances of "classic prior restraint" because the party is free to
disseminate the same information closed by the protective order, so long as
they employ other means to gather the information.9' The Court found that
the Washington discovery rules further a substantial governmental interest in
helping litigants prepare for trial. More importantly, the Court found that by
leaving authority with the trial judge to determine "good cause," the judiciary
would protect against unnecessary closures. Thus, in Rhinehart, a unanimous
Supreme Court ruled that the Seattle Times had no first amendment right to
publish records given to them in the discovery process.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Rhinehart had an immediate effect on
lower courts across the country,' but its holding can be distinguished from
the Florida cases dealing with access to discovery records on several levels.
Rhinehart involved civil, not criminal litigation. Also, the factual scenario in
Rhinehart certainly was not a typical instance of the news media trying to
gain access to discovery records as a neutral third party; the case involved a
newspaper admittedly trying to publish information gained through its status
as a litigant involved in discovery proceedings. None of the cases which
developed Florida's common law right of access to discovery records can be
compared factually with Rhinehart. More crucial, however, is the lack of a
controlling public records statute in Rhinehart. The Washington Freedom of
Information Act does not contain a provision concerning access to discovery
records.93 As stated earlier, the Florida Public Records Act is the only open
records statute in the nation that expressly opens discovery records. This
statutory difference cannot be overstated. In Rhinehart, the Court concluded
that in Washington, "the rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the
state legislature," so "the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative
grace." Any federal judicial analysis of access to discovery records in
Florida would require greater deference to the right of public access, because
the open records law limits the judiciary's power to seal records.
In Florida, the majority of the decisions immediately following Rhinehart
supported the right of access to discovery records. In Short v. Gaylord
Broadcasting Co.," the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed trial court
application of the Lewis three-part test opening discovery depositions and
records. Likewise, in Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers,' the Fourth

District Court of Appeal granted access to all information furnished defense
counsel in the widely publicized investigation of the fatal overdose of David
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92. Katherine Pownell, The First Amendment and Pretrial Discovery Hearings: When Should the
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Kennedy. Bludworth arose from a state attorney's refusal to furnish the press
with information the day after Kennedy's body was discovered in a Palm
Beach hotel room.' Two days later, Palm Beach Newspapers filed an emergency complaint to enforce the public records law, demanding release of the
medical examiner's report and of information specifically excluded from the
criminal intelligence and criminal investigation exemptions of the Public
Records Act." The trial court ordered release of the medical examiner's report and information regarding the time, date, and location of the crime; the
name, sex, and age of the suspect; and the crime charged." Bludworth refused to release the records, even after two arrests were made in connection
with Kennedy's death and the state attorney's office admitted that records
already had been given to the defendants pursuant to discovery. After several
more motions from both parties, the matter was appealed. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal stated that the question presented was the scope of the provision of the open records law granting public access to discovery materials." ° The newspaper argued that the section encompasses all information
shared by the state with the criminal defendant. Bludworth argued that the
section refers only to information showing a person's arrest.
The court reviewed the legislative intent behind the section and concluded that had the legislature intended to exclude discovery materials, it had
every opportunity to do so. Given the underlying policy of the Public Records Act-open government to the extent possible without undermining
significant government functions such as crime detection-it seemed more
likely to the Court that the legislature meant that once documents are released, the legislature intended an end to secrecy about those documents.'
Furthermore, the court found that because the Public Records Act states "allinclusively" that records should be open before listing exemptions, "the rules
of statutory interpretation include the principle that when the legislature has
enumerated exceptions it has shown that it intends to leave all unmentioned

97. Id. at 776-77.
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"criminal intelligence information" and "criminal investigative information" shall not include: 1. The time, date, location and nature of a reported crime. 2. The name, sex, age,
and address of a person arrested or of the victim of a crime except as provided in s.
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items subject 'to the law.""'° Thus, the court ruled that under the open records law, all discovery records are presumed open for public inspection.
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, relied primarily on Rhinehart in
a 1987 case to rule that the press and public have no right of access to
unfiled depositions. In Palm Beach v. Burk,"°3 the Supreme Court of Florida denied media requests to obtain copies of court reporter notes and deposition transcripts prior to their transcription and filing." Citing the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Rhinehart, the court ruled that discovery
depositions are not judicial proceedings, and that there is no First Amendment right of access to depositions prior to their being filed with the
court. 5 The court found that access must yield in this instance to the orderly administration of justice, but only until the records are filed with the
clerk of court." Thus, Burk created a loophole for unfiled discovery records because many discovery documents never are filed with the clerk of
court.
Florida courts have successfully closed discovery records in other cases,
but only after satisfying the three-part test for closure. In 1988, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled in Florida Freedom Newspapers v. McCrary" that
where public access to discovery records collides with the defendant's constitutional rights of fair trial and due process, public access must yield. In
McCrary, newspaper reports of prisoners being mistreated in a county jail led
to charges against two sheriff's deputies. The deputies filed motions to seal
discovery records, claiming that their right to a fair trial was at stake." 8
Florida Freedom Newspapers opposed the motions, arguing that the discovery records were public records." Without formally applying the three-part
test from Lewis,"' the trial court granted both the motion to seal the discovery material and the motion prohibiting certain officials from commenting
2
on the case."' The district court affirmed the ruling.1
On review, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that while the lower court
did not formally apply the Lewis test, it satisfied the test through consideration of its own criteria." 3 The court turned to the separation of powers
doctrine to reject the newspaper's argument that the judiciary was creating
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new exemptions to the law."" The court stated that because access to discovery records is not a constitutional right, the constitutional rights of the
defendant take priority. Under the separation of powers doctrine, it is the
judiciary's responsibility to ensure that parties receive a fair trial. Because
the judiciary is responsible for the protection of these constitutional rights,
the court found that "there is no conflict between the statute and the constitutional authority of the judicial branch to take such measures as are necessary
to obtain orderly proceedings and a fair trial."" 5 The separation of powers
doctrine has been raised in subsequent cases," 6 but will apply only after the

trial court satisfies the three-part test for closure.
VI. PRIVACY AND THE FUTURE OF ACCESS TO

DIscovERY RECORDS

The most recent development in access to discovery records concerns the
privacy rights of third parties implicated by the release of certain discovery
records. In a 1992 decision, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a list of
"John Does" taken from the client lists of a convicted prostitute is not exempted from the open records law under the state constitution's privacy
amendment. The court's ruling in Post-Newsweek v. John Doe". made public the "client list" of alleged prostitute Kathy Willets. Willets and her husband, Jeffrey Willets, a Broward County sheriff's deputy, were arrested in
1991 and charged with prostitution-related offenses. Pursuant to a search
warrant, deputies seized the Willets' Rolodex and other lists containing the
names of her clients, amounts paid and other sexually related notations about
the clients.' All of these records were included in discovery requests by
the Willets. Several John Does then filed motions as interested parties to
deny public access to pretrial discovery materials. The trial court denied the
Does' motion and declared that once the state attorney provided the discovery documents to the Willets, the documents became public records." 9
When the state announced that it was prepared to release the documents, the
Does moved for a stay of release of the records. The trial judge ordered the
release of the names, concluding that people named on the client list of a
prostitute have no reasonable expectation of privacy."2° On review, the district court stayed the trial judge's order and certified the case to the Florida
Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court recognized the need to balance the public's
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statutory right of access against the Does' constitutional right to privacy, but
held that the three-pronged test articulated in Lewis was not applicable to the
balancing of interests in John Doe. Instead, the court applied the six-part test
devised in Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers,'2' a case involving the

common law right of access to civil proceedings and records. The court
chose the Barron standard because the Lewis test does not address the impact
of public disclosure on a third party's right of privacy and because Lewis
dealt with the closure of a pretrial hearings and not with the closure of discovery documents.' Then, turning to an examination of the Does' privacy
claims under Barron, the court rejected the Does' argument that Florida's
constitutional right to privacy protects them from having their names and
addresses released to the public." The court held that the Does' privacy
rights were not implicated because the Does had their names and addresses
associated with criminal activities. Relying upon Rhinehart, the court emphasized that the public does not always have a right to discovery materials:
"depending upon the circumstances and the subject matter, discovery may
'seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties.' ""
However, the court recognized that under Florida's open records policy,
records are open unless they fit under a legislatively created exemption.
Because the court found that the Does had no privacy interest at stake, their
names and addresses became public records when they were furnished by the
state to the defendants during discovery.'"
The Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Post-Newsweek had an immediate
impact on Rolling. Only three months after Post-Newsweek was handed
down, the Rolling trial court held a hearing on the issues raised by the
case.'" Because of Post-Newsweek, the court re-examined its earlier orders
requiring disclosure of discovery records.' 2 In Rolling, however, media or-
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ganizations relieved the court from having to rule on many of the contested
documents by suggesting a compromise. The media offered to allow
redaction of names and addresses of individuals whose privacy interests
might be affected." 8 The Rolling court accepted the compromise, and ordered the state attorney to review all discovery material not yet disclosed,
and to redact all identifying references of third parties "which contain personal information about an individual, about which an individual would have
a reasonable expectation of privacy."'" 9
In addition, the order allowed the state attorney to file a motion for nondisclosure of any other material which, if released, would violate the right to
privacy of any person mentioned in the documents." The order essentially
brought the release of discovery materials in Rolling under the purview of
the Florida Supreme Court's pronouncement in Post-Newsweek. The media
avoided lengthy litigation of the privacy interests of the many individuals
named in the discovery materials through its compromise offer of allowing
the state attorney to redact the names, addresses and other identifying material of third parties mentioned in the records.
Post-Newsweek's impact on Rolling was mitigated by the media's willingness to compromise in order to receive the remainder of the discovery
records. Most of the records, however, had already been released before the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that third parties possess privacy interests in
discovery records. In future cases, access to discovery records will prove to
be a far more contentious issue for courts to consider. For example, thanks to
the media's compromise, the Rolling court did not have to directly address
any individual or group of individuals seeking to restrict access on privacy
grounds, as did the court in Post-Newsweek. Future cases involving investigations nowhere near the scope of the Gainesville student murders probe will
implicate dozens of third parties, each of which may ask the court to restrict
access in order to protect their right to privacy.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Florida, discovery proceedings in criminal trials are a rich source of
records for journalists. During discovery, both parties seek to learn as much
as they can about the evidence and witnesses available before the trial begins. In criminal prosecutions, the state must provide the defense with any
matter which is relevant to the pending action. In Florida, the press and
public enjoy broad access to the records produced through discovery in criminal trials. The origins of the right of access lie not in the federal or state
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constitution, but in the Florida Public Records Act. The act exempts criminal
intelligence information, but qualifies the provision by stating that the exemption does not include "documents given or required by law or agency
rule to be given to the person arrested."'' Courts have interpreted the provision as providing a statutory right of access once discovery materials are
filed and assume the status of public records. This statutory right must be
balanced against the constitutional rights of fair trial and due process. A
court may prohibit disclosure of discovery records, but only after meeting a
three-part test. First, the closure must be necessary to prevent a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. Second, there must be no
alternatives available, other than change of venue, which would protect a
defendant's right to a fair trial. Finally, closure must be effective in protecting the rights of the accused without being broader than necessary to accomplish this purpose.'32 Before sealing discovery records, the trial court judge
must give notice to the media and hear arguments from parties seeking access. Finally, the trial court judge must set forth in writing the reasons for
closure.'33
Florida courts have applied this three-part test to open discovery records
in a wide variety of criminal trials. From the disclosure of discovery records
in the Theodore "Ted" Bundy murder trials in 1980 to the recent decision to
release discovery records relating to the Gainesville student murders trial of
Danny Rolling, Florida courts have routinely ruled that the press and public
have a right to know the contents of records generated during discovery
before a public trial. That right is not written in stone, however. Discovery
records can produce highly inflammatory media coverage, and the courts
must protect the defendant from prejudicial pretrial publicity. Every highprofile criminal trial offers the potential for collision between the constitutional rights of the defendant to receive a fair trial with an impartial jury, and
the rights of the public and media under the Florida Public Records Act.
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